When Is It Not Rape? ⚖️ False Promise of Marriage
7 Supreme Court judgments that draw the line between a broken promise and a false one — updated September 2026
Few areas of criminal law are as widely misunderstood as this one. A relationship ends. A marriage does not happen. An FIR follows. The assumption — held by complainants, by families, and not infrequently by investigating officers — is that the failure to marry is itself the offence.
The Supreme Court has said otherwise for over two decades. The offence lies in the deception, not in the disappointment.
First, the law has changed
Under the Indian Penal Code, these cases were tested through Section 375 read with Section 90 — the question being whether consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact.
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 changed the architecture. Section 69 BNS now creates a distinct offence: sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means, or by a promise to marry made with no intention of fulfilling it, where such conduct does not amount to rape. Punishment extends to ten years. The Explanation defines "deceitful means" to include a false promise of employment or promotion, and marrying by suppressing identity.
This matters practically. The conduct is carved out of rape and given its own, lesser offence — which changes the bail calculus, the trial posture, and the quashing analysis.
Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1818 (7 September 2026)
Pardiwala and Vinod Chandran, JJ.
The Court held that the statutory words in Section 69 import the same essential requirement as the old law: the promise must have been made with an intention, from the outset, that it would never be fulfilled. The Court described Section 69 as carving the fraudulent and deceitful conduct out of the grave offence of rape, while still providing a penalty for it. On the facts, the complainant and the appellant met through a digital platform; the relationship moved from friendship to a love affair; the appellant expressed a desire to marry at their first physical meeting; the refusal to marry was later attributed to his mother's objection. The Court found no material showing deceitful inducement and quashed the FIR.
The basic legal rule: breakup alone does not make it rape
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mere failure to marry or subsequent breakup does not by itself establish rape.
The crucial question is: Was the consent genuinely obtained through deception, coercion or a false promise — or was it voluntary?
In cases involving a promise of marriage, the Court has particularly examined whether the accused never intended to marry from the very beginning and whether that false promise directly induced the sexual relationship.
7 Supreme Court judgments that clarified the law
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608
The anchor authority
To vitiate consent, two elements must be shown: the promise must have been false — given in bad faith with no intention of being honoured when made — and it must have had immediate relevance to the woman's decision to engage in the act. A promise that is genuine when made but defeated later is not a false promise.
Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675
The foundational distinction
Misconception of fact cannot be alleged where the promise was made with good intention and the person was later forced to resile from it because of unavoidable circumstances.
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191
Consensual relationship — FIR quashed
A consensual relationship between adults does not retrospectively become an offence because it failed. Where the accused was genuinely willing to marry but circumstances intervened, no offence is made out. The FIR was quashed.
Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 181
Complaint must disclose the ingredients
Applying Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, the Court held that the complaint itself must disclose the ingredients. Where the FIR, taken at its highest, shows nothing more than a subsequent refusal, the prosecution cannot survive.
Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108
Four-year relationship — consent voluntary
A close examination of whether consent was in fact vitiated. Over a four-year relationship, the Court found consent to be voluntary and the accused's inability to marry attributable to circumstances rather than deceit.
Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471
Duration of relationship as indicator
Practically the most useful. The Court held that the longer the duration of a physical relationship without protest and without insistence on marriage by the female partner, the more indicative it is of a consensual relationship rather than one founded on a false promise.
Prithivirajan v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 696
Intervening circumstances — proceedings quashed
The Court found nothing on record to suggest the initial promise was false at the outset; the FIR itself indicated that the promise could not be fulfilled because of intervening circumstances, the relationship ended, and the FIR followed. Letting the appellant face trial would be an abuse of the process of the Court. Proceedings under Sections 417, 376 and 506 Part I IPC were quashed.
The other side of the line — where convictions follow
The same jurisprudence produces convictions where deceit is established at inception.
Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 13 SCC 1
The conviction was sustained: the accused had no intention of marrying the prosecutrix at any point, his marriage with another woman having already been settled. Consent obtained on that footing is no consent at all.
Allahabad High Court — January 2026
The court declined to quash proceedings against a married man, reasoning that a man who is already married prima facie knows he cannot lawfully marry another woman, so a promise of marriage in those circumstances is inherently deceptive.
The principle is symmetrical. It protects genuine relationships from criminalisation, and it catches genuine fraud.
What courts actually weigh
In practice, the enquiry turns on a recognisable set of factors:
Intention at inception
Was there a pre-existing impediment (a subsisting marriage, a settled engagement elsewhere) known to the accused?
Causation
Did the promise directly induce the consent, or did the relationship have an independent foundation?
Duration and conduct
Sustained cohabitation, travel, and family knowledge tend to indicate a voluntary relationship.
Reason for the breakdown
Family opposition, caste or religious objection, and financial collapse are intervening circumstances, not evidence of original deceit.
Delay in lodging the FIR
A complaint filed long after the relationship ends, often after the accused marries elsewhere, invites scrutiny.
The four corners of the FIR
At the quashing stage, the complaint must itself disclose the ingredients.
The quashing route
Where the complaint discloses no deceit at inception, the remedy is a petition under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC), read with Article 226/227, applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 — particularly the categories permitting quashing where allegations are inherently improbable or the proceedings are mala fide.
This is not a formality. These petitions succeed on the strength of the record, and they fail where the record discloses a concealed impediment.
Remember
A failed relationship is not automatically rape.
But a deliberately false promise used to obtain sexual consent can have serious criminal consequences.
The law turns on the facts, intention and nature of consent in each case — not simply on whether the relationship eventually succeeded or failed.
A necessary word of caution
None of this dilutes the seriousness of sexual offences. Where consent is obtained by force, coercion, deception, or a promise known to be false when it was made, the law responds — and it should. Section 69 BNS exists precisely because Parliament concluded that deceptive sexual exploitation deserves a dedicated penal response. The distinction the courts draw is narrow and specific: a genuine promise that later failed is not the same as a false promise made to obtain consent. Everything turns on the facts, the evidence, and the intention at the moment the promise was made.
Facing an FIR under Section 69 BNS or Section 376 IPC?
Aequitas Legis Associates advises on FIR quashing, anticipatory bail, and criminal defence before the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court of India.
This article is general legal information on the law as of September 2026. It is not legal advice and does not create an advocate–client relationship. Outcomes depend on the facts and the forum.
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